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Escape of the German Army 
across the Westerscheldt, 
September 1944 
S.J. de Groot 
T he writing of this article was made possible by Mr. K. Schacht (Steinkirchen), former 
officer of the Bundesmarlne, who gave me the 
unpublished script of Mr. F. Roher. 1 Mr. Roher 
belonged to the Krlegsmarlne and took part in 
operations in the Dutch waters in 1944. He put 
together a captivating document. Some 
additional research had to be done to put it in a 
clear and complete perspective. The fact that a 
specially formed unit of the Krlegsmarlne was 
able, in 15 days, to ferry across the Westerscheldt 
100,000 men, 6,000 vehicles, 6,000 horse-
drawn wagons and 750 pieces of artillery, 
undoubtably lengthened the war and the 
occupation of a large part of the Netherlands. 
The evacuation across the Wester-Scheldt surely 
can be found in literature. The role of the 
Kriegsmarine, however, forms a forgotten 
chapter, even more so because the event was 
overshadowed by the long battle for the mouth 
of the Scheidt. Now, 50 years after the event. 
through examination of the facts gathered by Mr. 
Roher, we will have to admit this was a 
remarkable logistical operation that was 
perfectly executed under the most difficult 
conditions. 
Background 
T he Allied landings in Normandy on D-Day were followed by months of bitter fighting. 
Slowly but surely the German forces were driven 
out of France, and the German 15th Army was 
pushed from the area where it had been stationed 
for the invasion, namely north of the Seine, and 
into Belgium. This army belonged to Army Group 
B (Model). Because the retiring Germans nestled 
themselves stubbornly in the Channel ports and 
could not easily be driven out of them, the 
advancing Allied armies were getting into 
problems with their logistics. At this point in 
the war, and in fact up until the end of November 
when the large port facilities at Antwerp were 
finally opened, the bulk of Allied units and 
supplies were still being landed over the D-Day 
beaches. The few captured Channel ports did 
not have the capacity to take over this function. 
It was essential to get the port of Antwerp into 
operation to ease the logistical situation. On 4 
September, Antwerp, with its harbour 
installations intact, was taken practically without 
a blow. However, until the banks of the Scheidt 
estuary could be cleared, the British Army had 
to be supplied along the road from Bayeux, a 
distance of 375 km. The American Army had 
the famous "Red Ball Express" that brought daily 
7,000 tons of supplies for Bradley's Army. 2 
It is still a point of contention why the British 
and Canadian troops after the fall of Antwerp 
hesitated so long to push northward. Not until 2 
October, nearly a month after the capture of 
Antwerp, did they begin the clearance operations. 
A very important factor, beside the logistic 
problems, was the tenacious resistance given by 
the 15th Army. Their new commander, General 
G. von Zangen, realised that the largest part of 
his army was threatened to be trapped between 
the Scheidt and North Sea on the one side and 
the liberated part of the Netherlands on the other. 
Beside the strategically important object of 
keeping the mouth of the Scheidt closed off as 
long as possible and therefore preventing the use 
of the harbour by the Allies, there was now the 
need to save as many units as possible from the 
danger of the threatening encirclement. Only via 
the Breskens-Vlissingen and Terneuzen-
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The short distance across the Westerscheldt is clearly illustrated in 
this photo takenfrom Breskens looking across to Vlissingen. 
Hansweert crossings of the Scheidt, and from 
there across Walcheren and South Beveland, 
could they reach North Brabant. This made 
defence of the strip of land just north of Antwerp 
near Woensdrecht vitally important. This was the 
only route to the mainland for German troops 
who had been evacuated across the 
Westerscheldt. 3 Von Zangen requested the help 
of the German Navy in the Netherlands to ferry 
his troops across the Westerscheldt. It is at this 
point that Rohrer's account starts. 
Sonderstab Knuth 
I t was on 4 September 1944 that the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, 
Vice-Admiral G. Kleikamp, warned the staff of 
Army Group B that Antwerp could only be held 
for another five days. 4 But on the same day as 
this warning British troops took the city. It was 
not clear to the German High Command where 
the 15th Army was; it was presumably pushed 
up against the coast between Nieuwpoort and 
Breskens. On 6 September the Commander-in-
ChiefWest, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, 
110 
(Photo by Donald I. Grant. NAC PA 142253) 
warned Admiral Kleikamp, to take care of the 
ferrying of the 15th Army across the Scheidt. 
The 1st Sicherungsdivision ofthe Kriegsmarine, 
with headquarters in Utrecht, received the order 
to execute this task with the greatest haste. There 
were no plans ready for an evacuation of about 
120,000 men with all their equipment, vehicles 
and artillery. The day before, the order had been 
given to destroy all harbours, harbour 
installations, locks and canals. This order was 
rescinded and the commander of the 1st 
Sicherungsdivision, KapitanzurSee Knuth, was 
charged with the evacuation operation. 
Knuth had only been the commander for a 
few months. Right away the order was given to 
direct all surface ships via Dordrecht to the 
Scheidt. Part of the River Flotilla (Kapitan zur 
See H. Engel) was already on the Scheidt. 5 Engel 
requisitioned rescue material on a large scale. 
Knuth formed the "Sonderstab Knuth," 
consisting of himself, Kapitdnleutnant der 
Reserve R. W. Peters and Oberleutnant zur See 
der Reserve G. Kramps. He was ready to move 
to the theatre of operations on 6 September at 
2300 hours. Together with his chauffeur he made 
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the 250 kilometre long drive to Middelburg 
during the night. It was a difficult trip through 
dark streets, with many detours because of 
blown up bridges and danger from the air. They 
reached Middelburg 0500 hours the next 
morning. The local commander supplied them 
with an escort and they went ahead to the 
headquarters of General von Zanger in the village 
bunker. The commander of the 15th Army Corps 
had arrived there the night before. The 15th 
Army itself was situated between Zeebrugge, 
Terneuzen and Breskens. The troops would be 
gradually withdrawn with Breskens as the last 
bridgehead. This bridgehead had to be held as 
long as possible in order to deny the Allies access 
to the Scheidt. Von Zanger insisted in principle 
on bringing across as many men as possible. 
Knuth and his staff went to Vlissingen where the 
32nd Minesweeper Flotilla (consisting of 
transformed fishing boats) and the Outpost 
Boatgroup "Windhuk" were to be stationed. In 
THESCHELDT 
ESTUARY 
Roosendaal , 
e Putte 
Vlissingen they formed the staff responsible for 
the evacuation. The staff was soon joined by the 
ships from "Windhuk," the Vp 2004, Vp 2007 
and Vp 2011, and two Artillerietrager of the 1st 
Artillerietrager Flotilla. 6 Shortly, Knuth and his 
staff were joined by the commanding officer of 
the 32nd Flotilla, Korvettenkapitan Jacobi, the 
commander of the Sea Defence Southern 
Netherlands, KapitanzurSee F. Aschmann, and 
the Vlissingen harbour commander, 
Korvettenkapitan der Reserve R. Wurdeman. 
It was evident that in the preceding days, 
more or less chaotic, some scattered units and 
their arms were brought across the Scheidt. This 
had taken place using the ferries Queen 
Wilhelmina and Queen Emma, requisitioned 
Dutch fishing boats and the Kriegfischkutters 
(KFKs) of the 32nd Flotilla. Troops were ferried 
across at two locations, Breskens-Vlissingen and 
Terneuzen-Hansweert. It was estimated that, up 
lll 
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Allied photo-reconnaissance clearly revealed the extent of 
German movements during the month of September. 
Top: Two German vessels race into the harbour at Vlissingen after completing the crossing from Breskens on 
11 September. Numerous other vessels are visible tied up in the main harbour. At this stage there is little bomb 
damage evident in the port. (WLU Air Photo Collection 16413045) 
Above left: A convoy of vessels clears the harbour at Breskens, just visible on the left, 11 September 1944. 
(WLU Air Photo Collection 15913237) 
Above right: The ships making the passage between Breskens and Vlissengen made ideal targets for air 
attack due to the clear weather and their highly visible wakes. (WLU Air Photo Collection 159 I 4239) 
112 
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Above: The outer harbour of Ternuezen filled wit/1 shipping on 13 September. 
(WLU Air Photo Collection 1 7 4 I 4001) 
Below: Towards the end of the evacuation, heavy bomb damage is visible in Breskens, 22 September. In 
spite qf this, Allied air power did little to hinder the German retreat. (WLU Air Photo Collection 192 I 4002) 
113 
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"Scheldt Crossing" by D.A. Colville 
to 7 September, 25,000 men were ferried across. 
This left 100,000 men still on the south side of 
the Scheidt. The operation began with 60 ships 
but this was quickly increased to 75. As well, 
the original Dutch crews were replaced with 
German personnel. There was doubt about the 
full cooperation of the Dutch, and the fact that 
the vessels would be in service around the clock. 7 
Because the situation at the embarkation 
points threatened to get out of hand, Knuth asked 
Kleikamp to take the necessary steps to ferry 
the constant stream of soldiers as effectively as 
possible and transport them to the east. 
Assembly points, road commanders and 
interception units had to be installed. Two 
officers of the 32nd Flotilla's staff were used to 
regulate the boarding, Oberleutnant zur Seeder 
Reserve Lessing in Breskens and an adjutant-
boatsman at Terneuzen. At the opposite shore 
114 
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these functions were performed by the Vlissingen 
harbour commander and officers of the 32nd 
Flotilla, and at Hansweert by Korvettenkapitan 
Stein. 
As order was brought to the operation, the 
15th Army started to select essential material 
for the crossing. Also, the motor vehicles were 
repacked so as to make the most efficient use of 
space. A defensive line was created between 
Breskens and Terneuzen (Nieuwvliet, Oostburg, 
Ijzendijke, Boekhoute, Assenede, Sas van Gent, 
Axel). Assembly points and dressing stations 
were arranged. The transportation of the 
wounded, first on ordinary ships, was continued 
on hospital ships. 
Sonderstab Knuth took as their 
headquarters the commando-bunker of the 
Vlissingen Navy Commander. In the meantime, 
6
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the communication material arrived from 
Utrecht under the command of Kapitanleutnant 
N. Godehart. In addition to providing 
communications between the ships and the staff 
on shore and higher echelons, this unit of the 
1st Sicherungsdivision also took care of the 
battle information (B. Dienst). To lessen the risk 
of air attacks, the communication vehicles were 
set up in Veere. 8 
The work of the staff charged with the 
crossing entailed, however, much more. It was 
essential to bring the units across with all their 
vehicles, so that these units could be on the road 
to the east to escape the threatened closure of 
South Beveland. Much heavy material, namely 
heavy trucks and artillery, were moved by ship 
directly to their temporary end position. 
Preparations had to be made for the installation 
of mines and obstructions near Doel. Besides 
this, they had to regularly sweep for mines at 
the crossing locations. To the south of the Scheidt 
they formed a special group from the 344th 
Infantry Division to make order and keep it. 
Unofficial crossings were stopped. 
The Day-by-Day Story 
7 and 8 September 
The bad weather made the crossing much 
tougher and the organisation of the Sonderstab 
was not yet felt. 
9September 
The need for the larger ferries was quite clear. 
Besides vehicles and other material, these ships 
could take 300 to 400 men across per trip from 
Breskens to Vlissingen. Units of the 36th 
Minesweeper Flotilla also took part in the 
evacuation. Anti-aircraft defences had to be 
improved. The ferries were equipped with 2 em 
anti-aircraft guns (the Queen Wilhelmina with 
four guns and the Queen Emma with two). The 
Artillerietragers travelling with the ferries were 
responsible for their air defences. In principle 
they sailed day and night when there was no 
danger from the air. It was here that the B Dienst 
in Veere played a very important role. This day 
they took across heavy motorized artillery ( 17 
em). This took place on the route Terneuzen-
Hansweert. There were eight to ten KFKs and 
six motorboats of the Rhine flotilla active here, 
also a Siebel jahre (a type oflanding ship vehicle 
transport) and five or six navy lighters (Marine-
Fahrprahme). This route was much longer than 
the Breskens-Vlissingen route, so there were only 
two crossing a night possible (and often only 
one). The inner harbour ofTerneuzen proved to 
be an ideal place for the loading of heavy railway 
artillery (21 em). The fact that this material, once 
loaded, could be shipped directly through the 
South Beveland canal northwards, made this 
loading point very valuable. The improvement 
of order among the troops around Terneuzen was 
charged to the 17th Luftwaffe Field Division. 
10 September 
The weather improved and 5,000 soldiers 
were taken across. The outpost boats could 
transport 300 soldiers or 15 cars a ship, while 
the anti-aircraft guns could be fully used. New 
reinforcements arrived in Vlissingen - namely 
eight KFKs of the 36th Minesweeper Flotilla. 
11 September 
More soldiers than the day before could be 
ferried across. Two Raumboote (fast shallow-
water minesweepers), the R-83 and R-85, took 
part in the operation from this day. The first 
heavy air attacks took place on Breskens. The 
air defences were constantly strengthened, 
supplied from the material of the 15th Army. 
The air attacks caused 120 dead and wounded, 
beside a heavy loss of materials. The place of 
embarkation, Breskens, was out off commission 
for ten hours. But thanks to building materials 
from the destroyed houses in the area, the 
hoardings were not delayed any longer. 
12 September 
At 0400 hours the crossing was again in full 
swing. More and more dug-outs for the men were 
built. In Breskens they took care that the BOO-
metre-long street leading to the boarding place 
was not packed full with vehicles when there 
were no ships to take them aboard. Slowly the 
front line around Breskens and Terneuzen was 
shortening. The largest number of ships - 75 -
was now available for the evacuation. The 2nd 
Artillerietrager Flotilla (KapiUinleutnant von 
115 
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Haxhausen) joined the ships on the Scheidt. They 
were placed as floating batteries. It was also the 
first time that 10,000 men with their equipment 
were ferried across in a single day. 
On this day it was Terneuzen's turn to be 
bombarded. Because the telephone connection 
was put out of commission, Kapitc'inleutnant der 
Reserve W. Peters received the order to go and 
check. With the R-83 they left the harbour of 
Vlissingen and found that Terneuzen was afire. 
The loading dock in the outer harbour was 
destroyed and three lighters sunk. The much 
more valuable inner harbour was still intact. 
Personal losses were small, but it took 24 hours 
before everything was functional again. The units 
left on the south side of the Scheidt started to 
worry whether they would be able to reach the 
other side and leave South Beveland. The 
possible loss of Woensdrecht was the cause of 
this fear. The ferry Queen Emma received a 
direct hit on the rear deck. The number of air 
attacks on the retiring troops was increasing 
constantly. 
14 September 
The B-Dienst at Veere was successful in the 
interception of messages regarding impending 
air attacks. The early wamings allowed ships to 
leave the harbours. This day more than 10,000 
men were ferried across. A new route came into 
use, Ellewoutsdijk-Hansweert. It was along this 
route that most of the infantry was brought 
across. 
15 September 
While the crossing was in full swing a heavy 
air attack took place on Vlissingen. However, due 
to the earlier precautions, the attack had 
minimal effect. The number of casualties among 
the troops was small. 
16 September 
The dead of the previous day's attack, among 
them the Navy Officer who coordinated the 
technical supplies, Leutnant Ubben, were buried 
without the interference of air attack. More than 
10,000 men were brought across Terneuzen and 
this again got the attention of the Allied air forces, 
but the ferrying carried on. 
116 
17 September 
This day the dykes of the isle of Walcheren 
were bombed to let in the sea water. Terneuzen 
came under fire by Allied artillery. Preparations 
were made for the laying of a mine barricade 
nearDoel. 
18 September 
Only the 64th Infantry Division was still on 
the south side of the Scheidt. This Division would 
stay behind to hold Breskens as long as possible. 
It was not until October that these units were 
ferried to Walcheren, but by then the Island was 
encircled. At Terneuzen only one demolition 
group stayed behind, all other men were ferried 
to Hansweert. 
The hospital ships with clear Red Cross 
markings did their work without much ado. 
Doctors did their best to save the wounded from 
the fate of prisoners of war. They were 
transported along the Dutch inland waterways 
to Wesel and Emden. There were two hospital 
ships attacked by fighter-bombers, one was sunk 
between Veere and Dordrecht and the other was 
set afire and grounded near Zijpe. 
19 September 
R-83 and R-85 sailed under the protection 
of darkness to Terneuzen to pick up the 
demolition group. Early in the moming they were 
taken aboard under enemy fire and sailed back 
to Vlissingen. Troops continued to be ferried 
across from Breskens to Vlissingen. These 
combat troops displayed good discipline. 
The completion of the mine barricade at Doel 
suffered delay because the rubber closure rings 
of the mines had to be replaced, for there was 
leakage. It took two days for this to occur, after 
which the mines were set. 
20 September 
The crossing of the 15th Army was completed 
and reported to Vice-Admiral Kleikamp. He gave 
the order for Sonderstab Knuth to return to 
Utrecht. 
8
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21 September 
Knuth and his people began the return trip. 
They made a short stop at the staff of the 15th 
Army in Dordrecht and the lst Artillerietrager 
Flotilla after which they reached Utrecht at 
2315 hours. A small welcome party was held 
and the Sonderstab was eliminated without any 
fanfare. In retrospect, Knuth could look back 
on a very successful operation. Thanks to his 
activity, 100,000 men, 6,000 vehicles, 6,000 
horse-drawn wagons and 750 artillery pieces 
(from 2 em cannon to 21 em railway guns) were 
ferried across to fight again. In total, nine 
divisions were brought across- the 59th, 70th, 
245th, 33lst, 344th, 346th, 7ll th and 712nd 
Infantry Divisions and the 17th Luftwaffe Field 
Division. 
24 September 
The officers who took part in the operation 
were decorated. In recognition for his efforts, 
Knuth received the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen 
Kreuzes. 
Concluding Remarks 
0 n the same day that Sonderstab Knuth completed its task, 21 September, the 
Royal Navy, formed Force "T' at Brugge to ferry 
Allied troops across the Westerscheldt. The long 
awaited closure of South Beveland finally took 
place with the breakthrough of the Canadian 
troops at Woensdrecht on 4 October. This closed 
off the only land escape route. There still 
followed a bitter battle for the Breskens pocket 
and the isles ofWalcheren and South Beveland 
before the channel to Antwerp could be opened 
for shipping. The 15th Army stayed in the 
Netherlands for a few more months and was 
then set in for the defence of the Rhine. In 
December they took positions around Koblenz. 
This could have been avoided if the Allies had 
pushed on to Woensdrecht right away and cut 
off the escape route of the Germans. 
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